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Individuals rapidly extract information about others’ social identity, including whether or
not they belong to their in-group. Group membership status has been shown to affect
how attentively people encode information conveyed by those others. These findings
are highly relevant for the field of psycholinguistics where there exists an open debate
on how words are represented in the mental lexicon and how abstract or context-
specific these representations are. Here, we used a novel word learning paradigm
to test our proposal that the group membership status of speakers also affects how
speaker-specific representations of novel words are. Participants learned new words
from speakers who either attended their own university (in-group speakers) or did
not (out-group speakers) and performed a task to measure their individual in-group
bias. Then, their source memory of the new words was tested in a recognition test
to probe the speaker-specific content of the novel lexical representations and assess
how it related to individual in-group biases. We found that speaker group membership
and participants’ in-group bias affected participants’ decision biases. The stronger
the in-group bias, the more cautious participants were in their decisions. This was
particularly applied to in-group related decisions. These findings indicate that social
biases can influence recognition threshold. Taking a broader scope, defining how
information is represented is a topic of great overlap between the fields of memory
and psycholinguistics. Nevertheless, researchers from these fields tend to stay within
the theoretical and methodological borders of their own field, missing the chance to
deepen their understanding of phenomena that are of common interest. Here, we show
how methodologies developed in the memory field can be implemented in language
research to shed light on an important theoretical issue that relates to the composition
of lexical representations.
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INTRODUCTION
Previous findings have shown that people utilize any cue they
have available (e.g., gender, social class) to establish whether
or not others are members of their own in-group (e.g., Bargh
et al., 2012). Group membership can affect how people process
and remember information related to those others, with in-
group information receiving more attention and being better
remembered than out-group information (Hugenberg et al.,
2010; Greenstein et al., 2016). While advantages for in-group
members have been reported to affect a wide range of cognitive
phenomena (see Xiao et al., 2016; Molenberghs and Louis, 2018
for reviews), they have not been directly tested in the context of
language processing and language learning, yet.
Such effects are relevant for models of language processing
because they have consequences for an ongoing debate on how
words are represented in the mental lexicon. One aspect of this
broad issue is how well listeners maintain information that is
not strictly linguistic but that relates to the context, such as
the social identity of the speaker producing a word. In the
memory literature, this type of information is referred to as
source memory and it is a topic that has been extensively studied.
By using memory tests developed to probe source memory,
researchers in the field of psycholinguistics can gain a better
understanding of how speaker-related information is encoded in
the representations of words and whether the encoding of such
information is modulated by social factors, such as the group
membership status of the speakers.
The aim of the current study is to investigate the proposal
that in-group biases permeate language processing as well,
and that they affect the level of detail of speaker-related
information that is encoded when learning new words. We
propose that representations of words learned from in-group
members are more likely to contain highly specific speaker-
related information, as compared to representations of words
learned from out-group members, and that such differences are
in turn influenced by how strongly each learner prefers their
in-group members over out-group members.
Before turning to the current study, we review the relevant
literature. We start by reporting evidence that shows that the
social identity of the speaker affects how listeners process
language. We then describe existing exemplar-based theories of
language processing that provide a theoretical framework for
understanding effects of speaker identity on language processing.
We then point to a potential limitation of these models, namely,
their tendency to assume that the speech of all speakers is
treated equally. We propose that existing models should integrate
parameters that allow different degrees of encoding specificity
and assigning different weight to linguistic input depending on
speaker group membership status. Specifically, we propose that
linguistic information provided by in-group speakers is encoded
in more detail than information from out-group speakers. We
motivate our proposal with evidence from non-linguistic studies
in social psychology that report group membership effects on
memory and information processing.
Previous research indicates that when interacting with others,
information about their social identity is rapidly extracted
(see Bargh et al., 2012, for a review) and can influence people’s
attitudes and preferences toward those others (e.g., Greenwald
and Banaji, 1995; Jones and Fazio, 2010; Kinzler et al., 2011).
There exists diverse evidence showing that others’ social identity
can influence how listeners process language. For instance, it
has been shown that, when a speaker’s social identity is made
available via the speaker’s voice, listeners take the identity into
consideration and have particular expectations about what will
likely be said. If these expectations are not met, such as when the
desire of looking like Britney Spears is reported in a man’s voice,
language processing becomes harder (Van Berkum et al., 2008, see
also Walker and Hay, 2011; Martin et al., 2016). Similarly, speaker
social identity can affect how listeners perceive speech sounds
(e.g., Johnson et al., 1999; Niedzielski, 1999; Hay et al., 2006a,b).
For example, changing listeners’ expectations of a speaker’s place
of residence affected their responses in a diphthong identification
task. Participants reported hearing what they believed to be more
representative of the supposed speaker’s linguistic community,
independent of the actual linguistic input, which was identical
across the two conditions (Niedzielski, 1999). This suggests that
information about the speaker affects speech perception.
In short, this body of evidence shows that information related
to the speaker’s identity is extracted along with the linguistic
input and can influence the processing of the latter. Existing
exemplar-based models of speech processing argue that the
reason that social information is used in language processing is
because it is encoded along with linguistic input. These models
state that linguistic experiences are encoded as rich episodic
memories (i.e., exemplars) (e.g., Hay et al., 2006a; Goldinger,
2007; Nielsen, 2011; see Drager and Kirtley, 2016, for a review)
that contain information which is both language-specific (e.g.,
includes phonetic, lexical, and syntactic details) and context-
specific (e.g., includes pragmatics, speakers’ characteristics)
(e.g., Drager and Kirtley, 2016).
Recently, in a new model by Münster and Knoeferle (2018) the
contributions of encoding speakers and listeners’ characteristics
during on-line language processing were formally defined.
Grounded on a large body of empirical evidence, the model
posits that comprehending language in context, by, for instance,
extracting both speaker-specific and language-specific input in
tandem, may speed up and/or ease comprehension. For example,
consider a scenario in which the utterance “Every evening I
drink some wine before I go to sleep” is produced by an adult
speaker. Based on the age of the speaker, listeners can build
up probabilistic inferences about what is more likely to follow
the verb drink (e.g., in the case of an adult, the word wine is
more probable than the word milk). By pre-activating lexical
items that are more probable, listeners can easily make sense of
the new piece of information, i.e., the word wine, speeding up
comprehension (see Münster and Knoeferle, 2018 for details).
Crucially, Sumner et al. (2014) proposed that the social
context might not only be encoded with the linguistic input
but might modulate the strength of its encoding. In support
of this account, Sumner et al. (2014) showed that idealized
phonetic variants are encoded with greater weight than common,
therefore more frequent, phonetic variants. According to their
model, phonetic variants with higher prestige (i.e., idealized
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ones) receive an advantage in representation and processing as
compared to variants characterized by lower prestige. Extending
their theory to more general linguistic processes, one could
hypothesize that people would encode linguistic variations more
strongly if they are associated with contexts and speakers that
have a special status.
Here, we propose that learning new words from speakers that
are ascribed a special status might lead to lexical representations
that are richer in contextual information (e.g., speaker-related
information), as compared to representations of words learned
from speakers without a special status. An example of speakers
that are ascribed a special status is the case of in-group members.
Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that group membership
influences input processing and learning. For instance, memory
is usually better for in-group faces than out-group faces (e.g.,
Van Bavel et al., 2008; Hugenberg et al., 2010) and for
information delivered by in-group than by out-group members
(e.g., Frable and Bem, 1985; Wilder, 1990). Furthermore, people
learn better and process more quickly new associations between
previously neutral stimuli (e.g., geometrical shapes) and in-group
membership (e.g., the logo of their favorite football club) than
associations involving out-group membership (Moradi et al.,
2015; Enock et al., 2018).
One way in which in-group biases may work is via the
recruitment of additional cognitive resources (Meissner et al.,
2005; Van Bavel and Cunningham, 2012). Such additional
resources have been suggested to lead to in-group representations
that are characterized by a higher level of detail than out-
group representations. For example, when processing in-group
related information, people were shown to encode the source
of information in more detail than when the information was
related to out-group members. This resulted in them being better
in a source memory task when identifying in-group sources than
out-group sources (e.g., Greenstein et al., 2016), suggesting that
being exposed to in-group membership boosts the encoding of
individual-specific information (see Hugenberg et al., 2010, for a
similar account).
No study has tested whether lexical representations for the
same words can depend on the identity of the speaker that
tends to use them. If this is the case, this will have implications
for language learning, language processing, and linguistic
representations. It would extend current theories that examine
the role of input and its distribution in language acquisition and
representation by showing that the same distribution can have
different effects depending on who are the speakers that provide
different tokens in the input. As a first step, the current study was
designed to investigate which social information learners encode
when they learn new words from speakers who either belonged to
the learners’ social group (i.e., in-group members) or did not do
so (i.e., out-group members).
The Current Study
We hypothesize that listeners encode the social identity of the
speakers from whom they learn novel words and that the social
identity influences how detailed speaker-specific information is
encoded. To test these predictions, we carried out the current
study in which we examined participants’ source memory for
words learned from speakers from different social groups. In
the Main Experiment, participants were exposed to a learning
context in which they learned new words from speakers who
supposedly shared their university affiliation (i.e., in-group
speakers) and from speakers with a different affiliation (i.e., out-
group speakers). In the Control Experiment, participants learned
from two groups of speakers who supposedly attended two
foreign universities. Since in the Control Experiment the group
membership was not manipulated, because both universities were
unrelated to the participants, we could check that the patterns
hypothesized to be found in the Main experiment were indeed
a reflection of the social saliency ascribed to speakers’ group
membership and not simply a consequence of the contrastive
nature of our manipulation (i.e., teaching competing labels
spoken by different groups of speakers).
During the word learning task, all participants in both
experiments learned novel labels for uncommon gadgets.
Crucially, target gadgets received two competing but equally
fitting labels, one from a speaker of each affiliation (e.g., citrus-
peller vs. citrus-schiller, in English lemon peeler vs. lemon
stripper). Afterward, source memory for these words was tested
in a recognition memory test. Participants were shown one
speaker and one label at a time and asked if the speaker had
produced the label in the previous phase (i.e., forced choice:
yes/no). Lastly, we collected participants’ implicit in-group bias
(see “Materials and Methods” section for details).
In the Main experiment, we predicted that participants
would spontaneously monitor the speakers’ group membership
status. Consequently, when asked to recognize the source of
the new words, we expected participants to remember speaker
social group but to struggle remembering the exact speaker
that produced each word. Therefore, they should be more
likely to misattribute words to incorrect speakers within the
same affiliation than between different affiliations, i.e., there
should be source memory confusion. Following our hypothesis
about different levels of detail depending on social salience
and group membership of the speakers, we predicted that
words learned from in-group speakers would contain a higher
level of detail about who produced them, compared to words
learned from out-group speakers. This would result in in-
group linguistic representations that are more speaker-specific
and less prone to source memory confusion than out-group
representations. Crucially, this in-group advantage should be
stronger for participants exhibiting stronger in-group bias. This
pattern is expected to result in a significant interaction involving
speaker group membership and individual in-group bias. In the
Control Experiment, we expected no differences between the two
speaker affiliations. This would show that differential processing
of information learned from different groups is specific to cases
where group membership is socially salient.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One-hundred-twenty-four native Dutch speakers (age range:
18–26 years) participated in the study after providing their
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informed consent, as approved by the Ethics committee of
the Social Sciences department of the Radboud University
Nijmegen (project code: ECSW2014-1003-196). All participants
were students or recent graduates of Radboud University
Nijmegen. All participants were female, as were the speakers
from whom they learned the labels. This was done to avoid
that an additional social dimension (i.e., gender) of in-group
status could interact with the one we manipulated (i.e., academic
affiliation). Participants were randomly assigned to either the
Main Experiment (n = 62) or the Control Experiment (n = 62).
Materials
Materials for the Word Learning Task
Speakers
Eight fictitious speakers were created by pairing female faces
selected from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015) with
the voices of native Dutch female speakers recorded in our
laboratory. Prior to the experiment, voices were matched for
perceived typicality and attractiveness (paired d-tests, ps > 0.05)
via a norming on-line survey in which twenty different
participants participated. Each speaker was a unique combination
of one face and one voice, consistent across participants.
Speakers’ academic affiliation was randomized across participants
and indicated by the logo of the supposed affiliation displayed
underneath the photo.
Affiliation logos
For the Main Experiment, original-color pictures of the logos of
the Radboud University Nijmegen (i.e., in-group affiliation) and
the ROC Nijmegen (i.e., out-group affiliation) were used. For the
Control Experiment, original-color pictures of the logos of Pisa
and Florence universities were used.
Objects and labels
Twenty-four images of unfamiliar gadgets (e.g., lemon peeler)
and their corresponding labels were selected via a norming study
(see Supplementary Appendix 1 for details). Half of the gadgets,
hereinafter referred to as target gadgets, were presented with two
competing labels, which were equated for goodness-of-fit and
frequency. The other 12 gadgets were presented with a single label
and served as fillers. All labels were produced by each speaker
and audio-recorded.
Materials for the Individual In-Group Bias Task
Affiliation logos
The same logos used in the word learning task were used here.
Geometrical shapes
Black shapes for triangle, square, and circle were used.
Procedure
Word Learning Task
The word learning task consisted of an exposure phase and a test
phase. The exposure phase was presented as a communication
task in which participants were instructed to pay attention
to all the stimuli presented (i.e., faces, gadgets and labels)
and select gadgets based on what the speakers said, with no
explicit reference to the academic logos. Participants saw 24
gadgets, each named by speakers of both groups. Half were
target gadgets, for which the two groups of speakers provided
competing, but equally fitting, labels, whereas the other half
were fillers, for which unique labels were provided. Fillers were
included to minimize participants’ awareness of the nature of
the experimental manipulation (i.e., the contrastive nature of the
labels). Note that not all speakers referred to all the gadgets.
In fact, each gadget was only labeled by two of the eight
speakers (one per group of speakers). Speaker group affiliation,
speaker-label pairing, and label-group affiliation pairings were
fully randomized per participant. On each trial, a photo of a
speaker, together with the corresponding affiliation logo, was
displayed (800 ms). Then, while the photos of speaker and logo
were still on screen, the audio-recording related to the gadget
label was played. Simultaneously, the written form of the label
was superimposed upon the speaker’s mouth (1500 ms). Next,
three gadgets appeared on the screen and participants selected
the one that fit the audio and the written label (see Figure 1 for an
example of the learning display1). If the response was wrong, the
audio was repeated. Two exposure blocks were administered with
half of the gadgets (i.e., six fillers and six targets) introduced in the
first block, and the other half introduced in the second block. The
gadgets were randomly allocated in the first or second exposure
block per participant. Three exposure rounds were administered
per block so that each display was repeated three times, once per
round, in a randomized trial order.
After each exposure block, participants performed a surprise
source-memory recognition test on the gadgets introduced in
the preceding exposure block only. In each trial, they saw a
photo of a speaker with their affiliation logo and a written label
(see Figure 2). Participants indicated whether the speaker had
produced the label in the previous exposure phase via key press
1Due to copyright issues, none of the pictures of the gadgets in the example
corresponds to actual stimuli, but they provide a good approximation of the type
of stimuli we used.
FIGURE 1 | Example of the learning display. Participants had to select the
gadget that was mentioned. In this case, they had to select the first image.
Stimuli are not drawn to scale.
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FIGURE 2 | Example of a memory test trial. Participants indicated if the
speaker had produced the label in the exposure task. Stimuli are not drawn to
scale.
(i.e., forced choice: yes/no). Decisions were self-paced. Across
the two memory test blocks, there were 288 trials in which
all possible speaker-label pairings were shown. Of those 288
trials, 96 were filler-related trials (subsequently excluded from the
analyses) and 192 were trials in which target gadgets were shown.
Of the 192 target-gadget trials, 24 were matching trials (i.e., the
speaker had indeed produced the label) and 168 mismatching
trials (i.e., the label had not been used by the speaker). Of
those mismatching trials, 72 were within-affiliation mismatching
trials (showing a label along with a wrong speaker from the
same affiliation as the correct one), 72 were between-affiliation
mismatching trials (showing a label a speaker from the wrong
affiliation). The remaining 24 trials showed a speaker with a
label that competed with the one she used (e.g., the speaker
that had used “citrus-schiller” was displayed with “citrus-peller”).
They were only included to make all possible speaker-label
combinations available, but they were not analyzed. Note that in
all mismatching trials, the correct answer was that the pairing was
incorrect because the speaker depicted in the photo had not used
the displayed label in the exposure task.
Implicit In-Group Bias Task
Participants’ individual in-group bias was measured in a
perceptual matching task (Moradi et al., 2015), which has been
shown to provide results that are reliable within individuals and
across different test sessions (Stolte et al., 2017). Three geometric
shapes (circle, square, triangle) were randomly paired with logos
of three academic affiliations. For the Main experiment, the
logos depicted the in-group university – the Radboud University
Nijmegen, and two out-group affiliations – the ROC Nijmegen
and Tilburg University. To keep the two experiments comparable,
participants in the Control experiment performed the task with
logos of the Italian universities that appeared in the word
learning task (Pisa and Florence) and a third Italian university,
Bologna. Each association was initially presented ten times. Then,
participants performed a practice block of 24 trials, followed
by two blocks of 120 experimental trials each. In both practice
and test trials, a fixation cross (500 ms) preceded a blank screen
(between 1000 and 2000 ms) and the simultaneous presentation
of logo and shape (600 ms), following the timings utilized in
Moradi et al. (2015). Participants had 1500 ms to judge the
accuracy of the pairing. Feedback was given only during practice.
In-group bias in this task is usually indexed by faster and more
accurate responses for stimuli that are newly associated with
in-group membership compared to stimuli associated with out-
group membership (e.g., Moradi et al., 2015).
RESULTS
All analyses were performed with mixed-effects modeling
as implemented in the lme4 package (version 1.1-15; Bates
et al., 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2016) and the models’
random structures were determined following the procedure
suggested by Bates et al. (2015).
Before turning to the main analyses from the source memory
test, we performed a sanity check to confirm that, at the group
level, participants in the Main experiment showed the expected
in-group bias in the perceptual matching task used to extract
individual in-group bias measures.
Group-Level In-Group Bias
Analyses Over RTs
Prior to analyses, trials with incorrect responses or with RTs faster
than 200 ms or slower than 2100 ms were excluded. For these
sanity-check analyses, we selected only matching trials (i.e., in
which the logo of the university was displayed with the associated
geometrical shape) which referred to the in-group university
and the out-group university used in the study (i.e., the ROC
Nijmegen). We then performed an outlier removal procedure by
removing trials with RTs 2.5 SDs or higher from the mean per
condition, per participant. The resulting dataset was analyzed
using linear mixed-effect model in which log(10)-transformed
RTs were predicted by the fixed effect for Group Membership (In-
group vs. Out-group, reference level: In-group). We added per-
participant random intercept and by-participant random slope
for Group Membership. Results confirmed the usual patterns
for this task: participants were faster at recognizing in-group-
related associations than out-group-related associations (in-
group: mean = 709 ms, SD = 212 vs. out-group: mean = 754 ms,
SD = 199; β =−0.01, SE = 0.003, t =−5.03, p< 0.0001).
Analyses Over Accuracy
As with the RT analysis, the analysis included only matching trials
(i.e., trials in which the logo of the university was displayed with
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the associated geometrical shape) which referred to the in-group
university and the out-group university used in the study (i.e., the
ROC Nijmegen). Accuracy was analyzed using a logistic mixed-
effect model with a fixed effect for Group Membership (In-
group vs. Out-group, reference level: In-group). We added per-
participant random intercept and by-participant random slope
for Group Membership. Results confirmed the usual patterns
for this task: participants were better at recognizing in-group-
related associations than out-group-related associations (in-
group: mean = 94.70%, SD = 22.4 vs. out-group: mean = 92.88%,
SD = 25.72; β = 0.4, SE = 0.1, t = 3.17, p< 0.01).
The analyses confirmed that in the Main experiment, at the
group-level, participants showed a strong in-group bias for their
own university. Successively, we extracted individual measures of
in-group bias by calculating a per-participant measure of effect
size, namely Cohen’s d, from both accuracy and RTs over in-
group versus out-group matching trials. The measure calculated
over RTs was not a significant predictor in any of the models we
ran; thus, we will focus on the measure derived from accuracy.
Next, the results from the Main and Control experiments
are presented separately because the in-group vs. out-group
contrast only applies to the former experiment. The data from
each experiment was analyzed following the outlined steps: (1)
planned analyses on matching and mismatching trials, separately;
and (2) post hoc analyses over d-prime and response bias values.
Main Experiment
After each exposure round in the word learning task, participants
were tested with a recognition memory test. In this test, they were
presented with matching or mismatching speaker-label pairings
and had to decide via key press if the label had or had not been
produced by the speaker. We carried out analyses over matching
and mismatching trials separately. We predicted that participants
would show more accurate source memory of in-group labels, as
compared to out-group labels, and that such advantage would be
modulated by participants’ own in-group biases.
Matching Trials
To test whether source memory was better for in-group than
for out-group words, we ran a logistic mixed effects model
with accuracy as the dependent measure and fixed effects for
Group Membership (In-group vs. Out-group, reference level: In-
group), In-group Bias (centered continuous predictor), and their
interaction. Block (Block1 vs. Block2, reference level: Block1) was
included as covariate to control for potential confounds.2 We
added per-participant and per-items random intercepts and a
by-participant slope for Group Membership.
Overall, participants’ accuracy in the matching trials was
63.08% (SD = 48.28) and above chance level, as confirmed by
a one-sample t-test (i.e., 50%) (t = 10.41, p < 0.001). Results
2To ensure that the patterns of results were comparable across both testing blocks,
we also ran a mixed-effect model where response accuracy was modeled by Group
Membership (In-group vs. Out-group, reference level: In-group), In-group Bias
(centered continuous predictor), Block (Block1 vs. Block2, reference level: Block1)
and their interactions. We added per-participant and per-items random intercepts
and a by-participant slope for Group Membership. Results from this analysis
showed that neither the main effect of Block (p = 0.37) nor its interactions with
the other variables (ps > 0.16) significantly predicted response accuracy.
showed that neither Group Membership (β = 0.10, SE = 0.13,
z = 0.75, p = 0.45) nor its interaction with In-group Bias
significantly predicted accuracy (β = 3.13, SE = 3.23, z = 0.97,
p = 0.33). Participants’ accuracy did not differ between Block1
and Block2 (β = 0.02, SE = 0.11, z = 0.19, p = 0.34). However,
participants’ In-group Bias significantly predicted accuracy, but
only at the reference level, i.e., in-group membership (β =−6.90,
SE = 3.17, z =−2.18, p< 0.05). By re-leveling Group Membership
with Out-group as the reference level, we saw that accuracy
for out-group speaker-label pairs was not modulated by the
individual measure of In-group Bias (β = −3.76, SE = 2.93,
z = −1.29, p = 0.20) (see Figure 3). This means that the more
in-group biased participants were, the less accurate they were at
recognizing speaker-label pairs, in particular when the speaker-
label pairs were of their in-group.
Mismatching Trials
To test whether speaker group membership influenced the level
of detail for speaker-specific information encoded with the new
words, we analyzed accuracy on mismatching trials. By looking
at participants’ performance on within-affiliation mismatching
trials, where labels were paired with incorrect speakers but
belonging to the same affiliation as the correct source, we
were able to test whether the source-related information for
novel words was speaker-specific (participants should have
rejected the wrong source) or group-specific (participants would
have incorrectly accepted the wrong source). We hypothesized
that people would encode more speaker-specific information
with in-group labels than with out-group labels. We therefore
predicted greater confusion among out-group speakers than
among in-group speakers in the within-affiliation mismatching
FIGURE 3 | Accuracy (Hits) as a function of Group Membership and In-group
Bias (centered). Error bars represent standard errors.
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trials. We also predicted that this difference in accuracy would
depend on individual In-group Bias, such that the greater In-
group Bias participants exhibited, the greater difference they
should show between in-group vs. out-group trials. Conversely,
in between-affiliation mismatches (i.e., where an in-group label
was shown with out-group members, and vice versa) no
differences were expected.
To test these hypotheses, we ran a logistic mixed model
analysis with fixed effects for Mismatch Type (Within- vs.
Between-affiliation, reference level: Within), Group Membership
(In-group vs. Out-group, reference level: In-group), In-group
Bias (centered continuous measure), and their interaction
terms. We added Block as covariate, per-participant and per-
item random intercepts and by-participant slopes for Group
Membership and Mismatch Type.
Overall, participants’ accuracy on mismatching trials was
65.79% (SD = 47.45) and above chance level (i.e., 50%), as
confirmed by a one-sample t-test (t = 31.31, p < 0.001). As
expected, participants were more accurate for between–affiliation
mismatches than for within–affiliation mismatches (β = 0.53,
SE = 0.14, z = 3.10, p < 0.0001; mean = 70.35%, SD = 45.68
and mean = 61.22%, SD = 48.73, respectively). This shows that
participants encoded speakers’ affiliations. Due to a practice
effect, they were also more accurate in Block2 than in Block1
(β = 0.79, SE = 0.05, z = 15.95, p < 0.0001; mean = 73.61%,
SD = 44.08 and mean = 58.09%, SD = 49.35, respectively).
Participants’ performance was also significantly predicted by In-
group Bias at the reference levels (β = 7.98, SE = 3.03, z = 2.64,
p < 0.01) and by a marginally significant interaction of In-group
Bias with Group Membership (β = −3.52, SE = 1.96, z = −1.80,
p = 0.07), which suggests that participants with different strengths
of In-group Bias were differently affected by speaker Group
Membership. Specifically, simple effect analyses revealed that the
larger the In-group Bias, the better participants were at correctly
rejecting pairings involving the in-group membership (β = 7.98,
SE = 3.03, z = 2.64, p < 0.01). On the other hand, participants’
In-group Bias did not predict their performance with pairings
involving the out-group membership (β = 4.46, SE = 2.78, z = 1.6,
p = 0.11) (see Figure 4).
Furthermore, neither the two-way interaction between In-
group bias and Mismatch Type (β = −5.21, SE = 3.48, z = −1.5,
p = 0.13), nor the three-way interaction between Mismatch Type,
Group Membership, and In-group Bias reached significance
(β = 3.10, SE = 2.54, z = 1.22, p = 0.22). Therefore, participants’
performance in both between- and within-affiliation mismatches
was comparably affected by the Group Membership × In-group
bias interaction.
In short, results from the matching trials revealed a negative
relationship between In-group Bias and response accuracy,
especially for in-group pairings. This pattern suggests that
participants with stronger in-group bias were more likely to
produce misses with in-group speaker-label pairs. On the
other hand, results from the mismatching trials revealed a
positive relationship between In-group Bias and accuracy,
meaning that those strongly biased participants also produced
fewer false alarms when in-group pairings were involved.
These seemingly contradictory results can be reconciled by
FIGURE 4 | Accuracy (Correct rejections) as a function of Group Membership
and In-group Bias (centered). Error bars represent standard errors.
stepping away from simple accuracy analyses and by relying on
signal detection theory measurements which capture detection
sensitivity (namely, d-prime) and response bias (namely, C).
D-Prime and C Values
Analyses over d-prime and C measures allow us to test whether
participants’ sensitivity and response bias during decision making
processes differed for in-group vs. out-group related decisions.
We calculated two d-prime values and two C values per
participant for in-group and out-group trials separately. In
order to generate values that reflected participants’ decisions
to purely in-group or out-group trials, d-prime and C values
were calculated from participants’ performance in matching
trials (i.e., hit rates) and within-affiliation mismatching trials
(i.e., false-alarm rates).3 Between-affiliation mismatches were not
considered for these analyses because they were created by having
an element (either label or speaker) from each group and were
therefore not purely in-group or out-group related. We ran two
linear mixed-effect models with either d-prime or C values as
the dependent variable and Group Membership (In-group vs.
Out-group, reference level: In-group), In-group Bias and their
interaction as fixed effects. The models included per-participant
random intercepts.
The model that explored the relationship between individual
d-prime and the independent variables showed no significant
main effects or interactions (ps > 0.57), suggesting that
participants’ sensitivity was not modulated by speaker Group
3To calculate C and d-prime values, we firstly followed Macmillan and Creelman
(2004) and converted 0 values in False Alarms to 1/2N and 1 values in Hit rates
to 1-1/2N. Next, we subtracted the z-scored False Alarms rate from the z-scored
Hit rate. C values, were calculated using the following formula: (−0.5)× (z-scored
(Hit_Rate)+ z-scored (False_Alarms rate)).
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Membership or their own In-group Bias, nor the interaction
between them (see Figure 6A).
On the other hand, the model exploring C values showed a
significant main effect of In-group Bias (β = 8.60, SE = 2.55,
t = 3.38, p < 0.001) so that the more in-group biased, the more
conservative participants were in their decision (i.e., having a
bias for “no” responses). Importantly, there was a significant
interaction between In-group bias and Group Membership
(β = −4.26, SE = 1.97, t = −2.16, p < 0.05), showing
that participants with different In-group Bias strength were
differently affected by speaker Group Membership. Simple effect
analyses revealed that while In-group Bias strongly modulated
participants’ response bias with in-group labels (β = 8.60,
SE = 2.55, t = 3.38, p < 0.001), this was only marginally so with
out-group labels (β = 4.34, SE = 2.55, t = 1.71, p = 0.09). These
findings show that participants differed in their response bias
as a function of Group Membership and In-group Bias, so the
more in-group biased they were, the more conservative they were
in their in-group related decisions, as compared to out-group
related decision (see Figure 5). In other words, they were more
careful in attributing in-group words to any in-group speaker.
Control Experiment
We hypothesized that the tendency to monitor speaker social
identity was dependent on whether the affiliations were perceived
as socially salient, or relevant. To test this, we ran a control
experiment in which participants learned new words from Dutch
native students attending two Italian universities, as part of an
exchange program. In this experiment, group membership was
not manipulated. Participants still learned from two groups of
speakers, like in the Main Experiment, but here the speakers’
FIGURE 5 | Response bias as a function of Group Membership and In-group
Bias (centered). Error bars represent standard errors.
affiliations were supposed to be socially neutral because the
speakers belonged to two foreign universities. Therefore, no
differences were expected between the two groups. To control
for potential visual dissimilarities between the logos used,
participants performed the same perceptual matching task as in
the Main experiment, responding to pairings involving the logos
of the Italian universities. Similar to what we did in the Main
experiment, we calculated an individual measure that in this case
can be seen as an index of Visual Bias. This individual measure
was entered in the statistical analyses.
Matching Trials
We ran a logistic mixed effects model with accuracy as the
dependent measure and fixed effects for Affiliation (University1
vs. University2, reference level: University1), Visual Bias
(centered), and their interaction. Block was included as covariate
to control for potential confounds. We added per-participant
and per-items random intercepts and by-participant slope
for Affiliation.
Overall, participants’ accuracy in the matching trials was
57.52% (SD = 49.48) and above chance level, as confirmed by
a one-sample t-test (i.e., 50%) (t = 5.84, p < 0.0001). Neither
Affiliation, nor Visual Bias or their interaction significantly
predicted accuracy (ps > 0.27). Participants’ accuracy was better
in Block2 than in Block1 (β = 0.28, SE = 0.11, z = 2.51, p< 0.05).
Mismatching Trials
We ran a logistic mixed model analysis with fixed effects for
Mismatch Type (Within- vs. Between-affiliation, reference level:
Within), Affiliation (University1 vs. University2, reference level:
University1), Visual Bias (centered continuous measure), and
their interaction terms. We added Block as covariate, per-
participant and per-item random intercepts and by-participant
slopes for Affiliation and Mismatch Type.
Overall, participants’ accuracy on mismatching trials was
69.37% (SD = 46.10) and above chance level (i.e., 50%), as
confirmed by a one-sample t-test (t = 39.53, p < 0.0001).
Generally, participants were more accurate in the between–
affiliation mismatches than in the within–affiliation mismatches
(β = 0.20, SE = 0.07, z = 2.64, p< 0.01; mean = 70.55%, SD = 45.59
and mean = 68.18%, SD = 46.58, respectively), indicating that
even the irrelevant social affiliations were encoded to some
degree. Participants were also more accurate in Block2 than in
Block1 (β = 0.92, SE = 0.05, z = 18.00, p< 0.0001; mean = 78.14%,
SD = 41.33 and mean = 60.73, SD = 48.84, respectively). None
of the other main effects or interactions resulted significant
(ps > 0.16), showing that, unlike the modulating effect of in-
group bias in the Main Experiment, participants’ memory for
speaker-label pairings was not modulated by Visual Bias.
D-Prime and C Values
To be consistent, we also performed analyses over d-prime and C
values, as we did in the Main experiment. Crucially, we did not
expect any differences between the two academic affiliations. We
calculated two d-prime values and two C values per participant
for the two affiliations separately. We ran two linear mixed-
effect models with either d-prime or C values as the dependent
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variable and Affiliation University1 vs. University2, reference
level: University1), Visual Bias (centered continuous measure),
and their interaction terms. The models included per-participant
random intercepts.
The model that explored the relationship between individual
d-prime and the independent variables showed no significant
main effects or interactions (ps > 0.67), suggesting that
participants’ sensitivity was not modulated by speaker Affiliation
or their Visual Bias, nor the interaction between them (see
Figure 6B).
Similarly, the model exploring C values showed no significant
main effect of Visual Bias or interaction (ps > 0.24). There was a
marginal effect of Affiliation (β= 0.11, SE = 0.06, t = 1.90, p= 0.06)
with decisions made about University2 being numerically more
conservative than decisions involving University1 (see Figure 7).
DISCUSSION
We used a novel word learning paradigm to test whether learners
of new words monitored speakers’ social identity, such as their
group and individual identity. Furthermore, we asked whether
group membership status of the speakers and individual in-group
biases of the learners affected the level of detail of speaker-specific
information encoded in the novel lexical representations. We
additionally performed a control experiment and ensured that the
patterns found in the Main experiment were indeed a reflection
of the social saliency ascribed to speakers’ group membership
and not simply a consequence of the contrastive nature of our
manipulation (i.e., teaching competing labels spoken by different
groups of speakers).
In the test phase of the word learning task, participants’ source
memory for the new words was tested in an alternative forced-
choice task (i.e., yes/no) where they decided whether displayed
speaker-label pairs matched or mismatched what they learned in
the exposure phase. This task offered a proxy for investigating
the level of detail of speaker-specific information in the novel
representations. Results confirmed our prediction regarding the
general tendency to encode in parallel both linguistic content and
FIGURE 7 | Response bias as a function of Affiliation and Visual Bias
(centered). Error bars represent standard errors.
speakers’ social identity (i.e., speakers’ affiliation). This tendency
was reflected in the fact that participants made more within-
affiliation errors than between-affiliation errors, i.e., source
memory confusion. This finding provides further support for
models of word learning where linguistic units are encoded
together with speaker-related information (exemplar models e.g.,
Hay et al., 2006a; Goldinger, 2007; Nielsen, 2011; see Drager and
Kirtley, 2016, for a review).
Concerning our hypotheses about the effects of Group
Membership and In-group Bias, the results revealed a more
complex pattern than we had predicted. We had predicted that
participants would encode in-group labels with a higher level of
detail of speaker-specific information, as compared to out-group
labels. This phenomenon was expected to be reflected in (a) a
higher proportion of hit rates for matching in-group speaker-
label pairs and (b) a higher proportion of correct rejections for
within-affiliation in-group speaker-label pairs. Both effects were
predicted to be positively modulated by the individual In-group
Bias, so that the stronger the bias, the stronger the effects. We
found that indeed participants with stronger in-group bias were
better at correctly rejecting wrong in-group pairings (i.e., in the
FIGURE 6 | Detection sensitivity as a function of Group Membership and In-group Bias (centered) (A), and as a function of Affiliation and Visual Bias (centered) (B).
Error bars represent standard errors.
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mismatching trials). However, when looking at the matches, the
results revealed that those participants with stronger in-group
bias were also more likely to miss matching in-group speaker-
label pairs.
These seemingly contradictory results are hard to reconcile
when relying only on accuracy (i.e., correct/incorrect). For this
reason, we relied on signal detection theory measurements, such
as d-prime and C values, to gain a deeper understanding of
the phenomenon. These measures capture both hit rates and
false-alarm rates for conceptually similar items and allow us to
test whether participants’ detection ability and/or response bias
differed for in-group vs. out-group speaker-label pairs. Results
showed that participants’ detection sensitivity was not modulated
by our social manipulations such that they were equally sensitive
to in-group and out-group speaker-label pairings. On the other
hand, the model exploring C values showed that the more
in-group biased, the more conservative participants were in
their decision (i.e., having a bias for “no” responses), and this
was particularly applied to in-group related decisions. That is,
participants’ in-group bias and speakers’ group membership
influenced how liberally decisions were made, so that participants
with stronger in-group bias were more careful in attributing
in-group labels to any speaker. This pattern explains why
participants’ in-group bias negatively predicted hit rates and
positively predicted correct rejection rates: the stronger the in-
group bias, the more likely participants responded “no” to in-
group speaker-label pairs.
How do our findings reconcile with the initial predictions
and with previous literature? While previous studies showed that
source memory was more accurate for information related to
in-group membership, compared to information related to out-
group membership (e.g., Hugenberg et al., 2010; Greenstein et al.,
2016), in the current study we showed that the scenario can
be more complex. Participants with a stronger bias were more
accurate at correctly rejecting mismatches involving in-group
labels, but they were also more likely to miss in-group matches.
Looking closely at these patterns, we could deduce, and confirm
with our analyses, that it was participants’ response bias that was
mainly affected by our social manipulation of group membership,
and by participants’ in-group bias. Participants with stronger in-
group bias were in fact more cautious when attributing in-group
labels to any speakers.
Our results resemble previous findings by Castano et al.
(2002), who investigated if high vs. low in-group identifiers
differed in their decision preferences when they had to categorize
ambiguous faces as either in-group (i.e., Northern Italians)
or out-group (i.e., Southern Italians) members. They found
that participants that strongly identified with their in-group
membership were less likely to classify a target face as in-group
member, as compared to participants with a lower in-group
identification score (see Yzerbyt et al., 1995; Blascovich et al.,
1997; for similar results). The authors claimed that such a pattern
was supportive of the In-group overexclusion hypothesis (Leyens
and Yzerbyt, 1992), which states that when people are in doubt
about classifying targets as either in-group or out-group, they
tend to exclude them from their in-group. Such a hypothesis
seems to apply to our dataset as well where participants with
stronger in-group bias were more conservative when attributing
in-group labels to speakers.
We consider why it is that learners’ in-group bias and speakers’
group membership status might lead to differences in response
preferences, but not in detection sensitivity, as we had predicted.
In other words, what might it mean that an individual with strong
in-group bias is selectively more conservative when making a
decision that involves her in-group membership? Originally,
we had predicted group membership and in-group biases to
play a role during the encoding of novel words, leading to in-
group representations with more highly detailed speaker-specific
information, as compared to out-group representations. The lack
of modulation on the detection sensitivity measure by these social
variables suggests that in-group and out-group labels did not
differ in how they were encoded. Instead, we found a significant
Group Membership × In-group bias effect on response bias,
so that the stronger the in-group bias, the more conservative
participants’ responses were in relation to in-group labels, but not
in relation to out-group labels.
We believe that these differences in decision bias might
reflect asymmetries during retrieval processes for in-group
related episodic events, as compared to out-group related
events. Previous research has shown that response bias acts
during memory retrieval processes (Windmann et al., 2002) and
depends on criterion setting functions of the prefrontal cortex
(Schacter et al., 1998; Swick and Knight, 1999; Miller et al.,
2001). During recognition decision-making processes, this brain
region is considered to be involved in initiating, monitoring
and controlling item-retrieval from memory to maintain a
description of the information being sought and actively inhibit
memory traces that do not match this description (Buckner, 1996;
Fletcher et al., 1998; Wagner et al., 1998; Henson et al., 1999;
Tomita et al., 1999). Therefore, Windmann et al. (2002) suggest
that differences in response bias, especially when independent of
the accuracy of the memory, can be explained by the fact that
decision makers differ in what they prioritize in the task (i.e., the
detection of matches or mismatches).
In light of this evidence, our findings might reflect differences
in recognition threshold for in-group vs. out-group memory
traces. During the decision processes, the inhibitory system
of those participants who were more in-group biased was
activated to a larger extent to avoid creating false positives and
attributing in-group information to any source. Attributing in-
group labels to incorrect speakers might have been perceived
as more hurtful than missing the detection of correct in-group
speaker-label pairs, as the in-group overexclusion hypothesis
states. If this was indeed the case, these findings would
validate the claim that in-group membership information
recruits the control system to a larger degree than out-
group membership does, as has been previously suggested
(Meissner et al., 2005; Van Bavel and Cunningham, 2012).
Furthermore, such a response bias could contribute to the
effect known as out-group homogeneity in face recognition and
categorization tasks (Castano et al., 2002), where new out-group
faces produce more false alarms than new in-group faces do,
supporting the claim that out-group members are perceived as
more homogeneous.
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Of course, it is important to replicate the present novel
findings using different groups of speakers and different tasks,
as to ensure that these effects and biases do not reflect poor
recognition and/or high cognitive load in general. While the
analyses revealed that participants’ accuracy was above chance
level, it was still relatively low. Note that participants learned
about the affiliations of the speakers during the word learning
task, by seeing the faces of the speakers together with the logos
of the supposed academic affiliations. This means that during
the source memory test, they were potentially retrieving from
their memory multiple pieces of information (e.g., speaker’s
affiliation, label’s source). On that point, it is worth mentioning
that even though in-group trials included a logo that might be
more familiar than the out-group logo, as it is participants’ own
university logo, participants did not exhibit superior memory
for in-group items. Future studies should test whether our
finding replicates when the source memory task is simplified,
for instance, by participants learning the group membership
status of speakers in an earlier experimental session, and in a
more natural way (e.g., by listening to speakers referring to their
university lives).
Similarly, to gain a deeper understanding of how speakers’
group membership and individual in-group biases influence
language learning, it would be important to test whether source
memory (i.e., the speaker) and item memory (i.e., the word) are
equally affected by these social factors. While in this study we
investigated the encoding of context-related information in the
representations of novel words, and tested if its specificity was
modulated by group membership and individual in-group biases,
further research should test whether these factors influence the
linguistic component of the representations, too. According to
our general hypotheses, labels learned from in-group speakers
would be easier to remember than words learned from out-
group speakers.
If these patterns are substantiated, they will have far-reaching
implications for theories of language learning and processing,
as well as theories concerning prejudice and stereotyping.
For instance, the results suggest that interlocutors’ group
membership status and listeners’ individual biases may influence
how likely newly acquired information is to be generalized
to other interlocutors. In particular, for in-group speakers,
listeners with a strong in-group bias appear to be more cautious
when attributing in-group related information to other speakers,
preventing over-generalization, whereas speakers with low in-
group bias may be more liberal in their generalizations. One may
wonder whether this greater caution relates to social stereotypes
as well. It is well known that people tend to homogenize out-
group members whereas they are aware of the heterogeneity of
their own in-group. It would be interesting to examine to what
degree such findings relate to the findings from this study about
individuals’ greater cautiousness in attributing information to
in-group compared with out-group members.
Further research should explore more how social
characteristics that are ascribed to both speakers and contexts
during language processing, and information processing more
generally, influence encoding and storage, and how these, in turn,
affect decision processes during memory retrieval. Such research
would shed further light on the intersection between memory and
processing, including language processing, and, importantly, how
this intersection is influenced by the social properties of the input.
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